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Engagement with Non-State Service Providers  
in Fragile States: Reconciling State-Building  
and Service Delivery 
 
Richard Batley and Claire Mcloughlin∗ 
 
The OECD questions whether non-state services in fragile states may 
delegitimise the state in the eyes of citizens, arguing that ‘state-building’ 
depends on governments’ engagement in service management. This article 
reviews the available evidence to identify what types of engagement are 
feasible and most likely to contribute to service delivery, or not to damage 
it. It considers the capacity requirements and the risks associated with 
state intervention through policy formulation, regulation, contracting and 
mutual agreements, and concludes by identifying ways of incrementally 
involving the state, beginning with activities that are least likely to do harm 
to non-state provision.  
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1 The issue: managing the tension between state-building and 
non-state service delivery 
 
In fragile and conflict-affected states, there may be tensions between the imperative to 
provide basic services to the population urgently, by any means, and the imperative to 
prioritise state-building.1 At a general level, according to the OECD Principles for Good 
International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (OECD, 2007), service 
delivery supports the building of ‘effective, legitimate and resilient states’. Together 
with the maintenance of security and the enablement of economic development, the 
provision of services to satisfy the essential needs of the population is a core state 
function and a manifestation of the social contract with citizens (OECD, 2008c). How, 
then, does the tension between state-building and service provision arise?  
First, as the OECD (2008b) recognises, the effect of state fragility and conflict is 
likely to be that service provision by government is weak and other actors have stepped 
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1. We recognise that the term ‘fragile states’ is contested. Here we use the term to refer to states which are 
‘unable to meet [their] population’s expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through 
the political process’ (OECD, 2008a). State-building is ‘purposeful action to develop the capacity, 
institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the 
mutual demands between state and societal groups’ (OECD, 2008b). See Mcloughlin (2009) for an 
exploration of the debates and controversies surrounding the use of these terms. 
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in to fill the gap. Private entrepreneurs, households, communities and non-governmental 
organisations are likely to be major providers of the services that exist. Second, at least 
in the short term, faced with weak state systems and low capacity, international agencies 
may find it necessary to further bypass the state by funding urgent services through 
international NGOs to generate quick and visible improvements in living conditions 
(Rocha-Menocal, 2009: 3). But what is good for service delivery may not be good for 
state-building.  
A legacy of state-avoidance strategies, particularly after a prolonged conflict, can 
embed a parallel structure in the service-delivery landscape, leaving the state relatively 
weak and under-resourced in favour of NGOs (Zivetz, 2006: 17). An internal review of 
DFID’s portfolio in fragile states notes that there are ‘unintended consequences’ of non-
state services, including unsustainable operational standards and facilities; lack of 
upward and downward accountability of service providers; the failure of humanitarian 
agencies to develop sustainable local capacity; and the tendency for service providers to 
attract hostility from the state, because of their unintended political role (DFID, 2009: 
35). Ghani et al. (2005: 11), with Afghanistan particularly in mind, warn of the negative 
impact that non-state provision of core functions can have on the accountability, 
legitimacy and sovereignty of the state.  
On the other hand, to insist on direct provision by the state where there is very 
weak ability to fulfil the task makes no sense. The OECD deploys a typology of fragile 
states which differentiates levels of ‘capacity’ and ‘willingness’ and underpins its 
operational guidance on whether and how donors should engage the state in service-
delivery management.2 Whereas in extreme cases of declining states with arrested 
development it accepts that ‘parallel initiatives independent of the state can be used’ 
(OECD, 2008b: 33), in stabilising states it advocates arrangements where government 
may not be the direct provider of services but nevertheless assumes responsibility for 
making policy, contracting other providers, and regulating and monitoring services. 
These indirect ‘stewardship’ roles are increasingly seen by donors as important to 
restoring government responsibility and accountability in service provision (DFID, 
2009; OECD, 2008c; WHO, 2005). If effectively fulfilled, they offer a way of 
reconciling the dual imperatives of service delivery and state-building. 
But there are questions regarding whether and how states with weak capacity can 
effectively perform the indirect roles. The broad conclusion from research on service 
provision in fragile and non-fragile developing countries is that these roles are generally 
poorly undertaken; most non-state provision is rarely controlled or supported by any 
systematic intervention. In fragile situations, the state may be lacking in basic 
legitimacy and/or capacity, and in some cases may hardly be present (DFID, 2009: 33). 
Even in the more promising cases, ‘often there is no strong leadership championing 
reform within government, and capacity to implement reform is generally weak’ 
(Zivetz, 2006: 1). The question then, not only but particularly for fragile states, is what 
sorts of engagement by government with non-state providers (NSPs) are feasible – 
                                                          
2. According to OECD (2008b: 14), ‘Capacity means having the core features that enable the state to 
mobilise resources for key objectives, and is determined by territorial control, effective exercise of 
political power, basic competence in economic management and sufficient administrative capacity for 
policy implementation’. ‘Willingness refers to explicit political commitment to policies supporting human 
welfare’. See Brinkerhoff (2007) for a full discussion. 
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given these capacity constraints – and most likely to contribute to service delivery, or at 
least not to damage it. If the capacity does not exist and cannot be quickly ‘built’, there 
is a risk that intervention may not only damage the non-state sector but also further 
undermine the legitimacy of the state. 
This article draws on case studies of NSP-government engagement and recent 
donor material on service delivery in fragile and conflict-affected states in order to 
identify the factors that can enable or constrain the state’s performance of the indirect 
roles. The literature has some limitations. There are few empirical case studies of 
government-NSP engagement in fragile and conflict-affected settings; the information 
that is available specifically in relation to the types of roles states can perform is 
dominated by contracting; and there appear to be few publicly available evaluations of 
donor programmes which have aimed to strengthen state capacity to perform the 
indirect roles. As far as possible, the article draws on examples from fragile and 
conflict-affected states; however, the evidence base is thin (OECD, 2008b: 39). Much of 
what is written about them is based on normative, scenario-type statements, with 
isolated examples. We therefore also refer to the slightly broader literature on state/non-
state relations in non-fragile states where capacity deficits may be comparable. It is the 
exceptional cases of effective collaboration and co-ordination that have to be explained.  
 
2 Non-state provision and relationships with the state 
 
Non-state provision is a large-scale and ‘normal’ phenomenon at least in Africa and 
South Asia. It deals with the poorer as well as better-off sections of the population; it is 
supplied by a wide variety of commercial, voluntary, traditional and community 
organisations; and relationships between NSPs and governments have evolved 
differently between countries. It is important to recognise the prevalence of the non-
state sector, because policy documents have tended to imply that non-state provision is 
a special feature of fragile states. Its diversity is also rarely understood.  
Systematic information on the scale of non-state provision is not available, given that 
much of it is unregistered, unregulated and unnoticed. But there are estimates from some 
countries – though the figures are rarely comparable. Research in six countries of Africa 
and South Asia,3 drawing on a wide survey of the available literature (Moran, 2006), found 
that non-state actors were the predominant providers of primary health-care, water 
supply and sanitation, and important providers of basic education to all sections of the 
population. This is probably true in the majority of developing countries, and not 
exclusively where states are fragile.  
Whereas NSP in water and sanitation is largely for the poor and for areas beyond 
the reach of public systems, non-state health and education services address a broader 
span of consumers. Non-state health services are probably as likely to serve the poor as 
the rich; in Pakistan, even the most ‘vulnerable’ population is as likely as the better-off 
to use private health care. Government remains the main provider of primary education 
                                                          
3. This section is based mainly on research reported in articles by Batley, Palmer, Rose and Sansom (all 
2006). Though this study did not cover post-conflict situations, it is the only one we know of that has 
compared non-state provision across several countries (Nigeria, Malawi, South Africa, India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh) and service sectors. 
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to all groups including the poor, but in South Asia, as in Nigeria and Malawi, non-state 
schools, particularly the unregistered ones, also serve poor families (Rose, 2006; Rose 
and Greeley, 2006; Andrabi et al., 2006). It is wrong to assume that the poor choose 
non-state provision simply for want of access to public services. Surveys in Pakistan 
have found that users report dissatisfaction with government services and greater 
satisfaction with non-state provision of health care, education and water supply (CIET, 
2003; Planning Commission, 2003), and there are similar findings for aspects of health 
care in Enugu, Nigeria (McClean and Salui, 2003), and in Malawi (Lule and Ssembatya, 
1994). 
There is a great variety of types of provider. Individual entrepreneurs operate in 
health, education and water and sanitation, and are often the most abundant but least 
known category. Faith-based organisations (FBOs) and NGOs appear as direct 
providers in health and education, but very rarely in water supply except as facilitators. 
Community and household provision is most prevalent in water and sanitation. Even 
this categorisation of NSP organisations describes only the tip of the iceberg of 
organisational variety. First, the categories are not wholly distinct; the same 
professional practitioners frequently operate in both public and private sectors (Mills et 
al., 2001; Balabanova et al., 2008). Second, broad categories such as community-based 
organisations (CBOs), NGOs, FBOs and entrepreneurs disguise the variety of 
organisational forms and capacities that they include, making it difficult to generalise 
policy for governments’ relations with the non-state sector. 
Most private, mainly small-scale, commercial providers operate independently 
from government, occupying the gaps and deficiencies in public services or competing 
with them, and trying to avoid state attention. On the other hand, many service-delivery 
NGOs work in collaboration with government, either to improve public services or to 
complement them. The case for ‘partnership’ is now widely promoted by donors and 
acknowledged, in principle, by governments and many NGOs (Bano, 2007; Nurul 
Alam, 2007; Nair, 2007). However, the relationship is frequently beset by ambivalence 
and mutual mistrust, built on histories of rivalry and policy instability. Underlying this 
is a struggle for the control of scarce resources, in which donor funding has often played 
a significant part. Government officials, beset by the inadequacy of their own services, 
often prefer to fight against the ceding of territory to NGOs and the private sector. 
While there are elements in common, national histories affect the nature of the 
non-state sector and of its relationships with the state. For example, in Malawi, large-
scale mission-hospital and school systems work closely with government, while 
retaining some management autonomy (Kadzamira et al., 2004). Bangladesh is also 
characterised by its history of large-scale NGO activity, and by a small number of very 
large NGOs that work across sectors channelling donor funding to smaller 
organisations, in systems that have a high degree of autonomy from government (Nurul 
Alam, 2007). In Pakistan, commitment to partnership with NGOs and the private sector 
grew under donor influence and was consolidated under military government, at least 
partly as a way of bypassing the civil bureaucracy and provincial political leaders 
(Bano, 2007). In Southern Sudan, political, military and logistical factors determined 
the development of a rural health service that was fragmented, heavily dependent on 
NGO provision and with weak links to the urban-based tertiary hospital (Pavignani and 
Colombo, 2009).  
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3 The case for indirect forms of state engagement  
 
Relationships between government and non-state service providers are driven more by 
historical evolution, ideology, power and the capacity of public and private agencies 
than by technical considerations. There can be no standardised prescriptions for state 
engagement with NSP, but we can conceive of some broad technical options.  
One response to non-state provision might be to allow it to operate unhindered. 
This is the de facto though not de jure policy in most of the low-income countries for 
which there is evidence. States are often unable or unwilling to control or substitute for 
non-state provision. Indeed, why should they intervene in competitive ‘market’ 
provision? With regard to fragile states, the OECD (2008b, c) offers two answers. First, 
where state-building is the central objective, states gain legitimacy by being seen to 
provide services as part of the social contract with citizens. Second, even if non-state 
actors are the direct providers of services to clients, there are some indirect functions 
that independent providers if left alone will not provide efficiently or at all. These are 
essentially the ‘backroom’ tasks of supporting, co-ordinating and regulating within and 
between services: for example, setting policy frameworks, enforcing standards, 
establishing common school curricula and exams, ensuring universal take-up of basic 
services, training staff, building mains pipelines, and ensuring the standards of drugs. 
Through these indirect functions, the state assumes overall responsibility for provision 
without necessarily being involved in delivery at all. 
For particular services, there are specific reasons why governments (or local 
governments and community organisations) would assume the indirect roles, and 
perhaps also advance into direct provision. Health care (and other forms of professional 
service including education) is particularly associated with problems of information 
asymmetry, where consumers are unable to judge the quality of the service, may be 
misled by professionals, or may choose less effective services. Education provided only 
with regard to individual benefits will fail to realise the wider benefits (positive 
externalities) associated with a universally educated population, including the nation-
building that may result from a common syllabus and identity. Of all the services 
examined here, it is the one most often associated with the call for direct state provision 
(Rose and Greeley, 2006: 4). Clean water and sanitation are associated with the positive 
externalities (health and environment) that accrue to the whole population as a result of 
extending consumption to others. Finally, all these services have ‘merit goods’ 
characteristics, meaning that government intervention may be necessary to get people to 
consume ‘what is in their own best interests’, regardless of their own preferences 
(Stiglitz, 2000). Moreover, ‘left to itself the market will serve only those who have 
purchasing power’ (Besley and Ghatak, 2007), implying the case for subsidised public 
or private provision.  
This article makes no judgements about who (state or non-state) should be the 
direct provider of services. Its starting point is that, in practice, in the context of most 
developing countries, non-state actors have an important role in service delivery.  
The questions are whether, particularly in the case of fragile states, governments 
have the capacity to perform the indirect roles that only they can perform, and whether 
inadequate performance risks bringing about damage to service delivery. In the 
following section, roles are grouped as follows: 
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• engaging non-state actors in policy dialogue, and formulating policies that 
provide the framework for service providers; 
• regulating by setting minimum standards and enforcing them, licensing, 
accrediting and facilitating providers, and safeguarding consumers; 
• contracting out government-financed services to NSPs or contracting in the 
support of NSPs to government services; 
• entering into mutual agreements for jointly financed collaboration between the 
state and NSPs. 
 
4 Experience of the performance of indirect roles 
 
This section surveys the experience of state performance of the indirect roles in fragile 
and low-capacity settings in order to identify i) the level of capacity required to perform 
the different roles effectively (i.e. to promote pro-service outcomes), and ii) the 
potential risk or possibility of doing harm to non-state services. Our aim is to identify 
the major constraints on the state undertaking these roles in fragile situations, as well as 
the factors that have enabled cases of successful engagement. Under ‘capacity’ we 
include organisational and wider institutional factors, as well as the connections 
between the actors, including government, state agencies, NSPs and donors. Brinkerhoff 
(2007: 4) summarises this broad view of capacity as having ‘the aptitudes, resources, 
relationships and facilitating conditions that are necessary to act effectively to achieve 
some intended purpose’. Most studies (as also the OECD) focus on the capacity of state 
agencies but, recognising that the concern is with the functioning of relationships, some 
examine the other side – the willingness and capacity of non-state bodies that might 
provide services or take on the state’s core roles. By ‘risk’ we mean the danger that state 
intervention may have an adverse impact on non-state provision without achieving 
compensatory benefits. This may arise from malevolence as well as lack of capacity on 
the part of state agencies.  
 
4.1 Policy environment and dialogue  
 
In principle, government is responsible for setting the legal framework, defining policy 
goals and priorities, and planning systems of service delivery (Balabanova et al., 2008: 
22). These activities affect the general environment of non-state provision, establishing 
the rules of engagement between government and NSPs. They constitute a non-intrusive 
form of engagement because they do not usually impose obligatory conditions on 
service providers. Creating the policy environment, for instance, can begin with the 
principle of recognising but not interfering in acceptable NSP activities. 
Service providers benefit from a stable and predictable policy environment in 
which to operate (WHO, 2005). A recent Asian Development Bank programme to 
improve relations between the government of Pakistan and NGOs concluded that 
confidence and continuity in policy and practice can be guaranteed through ‘suitable 
legislation that grasps the ethos of … engagement allowing the Government to look 
upon NGOs as allies, while NGOs engage with Government without expectations of 
patronage or fear of coercion’ (ADB, 2008: 11). But the policy continuity required for 
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the development of long-term relationships is likely to be absent in fragile and conflict-
affected settings. Even in relatively stable countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Nigeria and Malawi, the environment of non-state provision is typically one of policy 
unreliability and legal instability (Batley, 2006: 243). Nigeria and Pakistan, for 
example, have seen historical lurches from state takeover to severe public-service 
decline, through the incremental growth of market provision, to the advocacy of 
partnership (Larbi et al., 2004; Batley et al., 2004).  
General and sector-level policy frameworks, which in more stable environments 
can establish clear roles and relationships, may be unworkable in fragile settings where 
state capacity is weak. The Health SWAp in Bangladesh is an example of how such an 
approach can enable greater and more effective public engagement with the non-state 
sector (Chowdhury et al., 2004). However, ‘the slow, patient, inclusive negotiations 
leading to a SWAp in a stable health sector are out of place in an unstable one’ 
(Pavignani and Colombo, 2009: 278). In post-conflict situations, international agencies 
can prematurely put pressure on national governments to formulate comprehensive 
health policies before capacity and information are in place, as Pavignani and Colombo 
(2009) describe in relation to Kosovo, Liberia and Angola. In practice, governments of 
‘disrupted health sectors’ are unable even to assemble information about the activities of 
NGOs and private providers (Pavignani and Colombo, 2009: 19), and this stands in the 
way of government adopting co-ordination and planning roles (Balabanova et al., 2008: 
38).  
Formal dialogue usually takes place in ‘set-piece events’ that are focused on policy 
design and the development of strategies, rather than in continuous interaction about 
policy implementation. It therefore privileges the participation of well-organised 
advocacy organisations rather than the often small-scale, local and informal 
organisations that actually deliver services. A World Bank study of the health sector in 
Bangladesh observed that: ‘alternative private providers have very little interaction with 
government. Thus, public-private engagement has largely excluded service providers of 
greatest importance to the poor’ (World Bank, 2003, cited in Chowdhury et al., 2004). 
In Nigeria, while umbrella associations of formal private schools and mission hospitals 
have engaged with government on behalf of their members, the much larger number of 
unregistered schools is excluded from formal dialogue (Larbi et al., 2004). Even among 
NGOs, Collinson (2006) notes that formal policy spaces in Malawi are dominated by 
national-level and urban ‘representative’ NGOs, whilst smaller district-level NGOs lack 
the resources to participate.  
Government agencies may enter into dialogue under pressure and reluctantly, 
given that this implies that they no longer have the monopoly of donor support for the 
service-delivery role (Sansom, 2006). Political agreement that NSPs are legitimate 
actors is an important precursor to effective engagement. Government capacity to 
sustain dialogue is often hampered by a shortage of human resources to lead and 
manage collaboration. In post-conflict Uganda, for example, lack of both skill and 
willingness on the part of government to engage with mission health facilities at sub-
national level was evident (Balabanova et al., 2008). In this case, the capacity of the 
non-state sector to organise and represent itself through the development of ‘bureaux’ 
was key to enabling dialogue with government (Seengooba et al., cited in Balabanova et 
al., 2008: 34). Similarly in the education sector, Rose (2006) notes that, in most cases, 
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national-level dialogue has been initiated by non-state umbrella organisations that see 
the opportunity to pressurise governments to recognise their contribution.  
Given the constraints in terms of both capacity and will outlined above, it is not 
surprising that, even where there is formal dialogue, it may have no significant effect on 
service provision. There is little evidence to indicate that government engagement with 
NSPs has resulted in government actually accommodating its views, as Rose (2007) 
concludes for the education sector. Real policy is likely to be made in other forums. In 
post-conflict Mozambique, certain NGOs did engage in dialogue with government 
through a donor-supported ‘co-ordination scheme’, but in reality policy was made 
behind closed doors (Pavignani and Durão, 1999). 
Even where formal policy-making is closed, in practice there is usually a 
continuous ‘informal dialogue’ between local government officials and providers at the 
operational level – about policy implementation rather than design. Informal dialogue 
changes the risk of exclusion from one based on formality to one based on informal 
relationships. It may not be transparent, and is often about doing deals in return for 
favours to allow certain non-state actors (water vendors, unregistered schools and 
medical practitioners) to operate or at least not to be harassed (Batley, 2006: 250). 
However, local and informal engagement has advantages: it is the point at which the 
history of mistrust and rivalry needs to be addressed, it raises fewer capacity issues than 
national policy dialogue, and it can be iterative and long-term. NGOs have often played 
intermediary roles in facilitating more open dialogue between government, community 
organisations and enterprises, particularly in water and sanitation – for example in the 
Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi (Sansom, 2006; Ahmed and Sohail, 2003) and the 
community-led total sanitation scheme in Bangladesh (Chowdhury et al., 2004). In 
Somalia, NGOs initiated engagement by inviting local government staff to training and 
presentations; and regional education bureaux were set up in some areas to review 
alternative basic education programmes. Low-key and consensual models of co-
ordination offer the possibility for government to learn lessons directly from NGO 
innovations, while understanding the constraints they face (Rose, 2007: 40). 
The major constraints on the performance of the roles of creating the policy 
environment and engaging in policy dialogue are at the level of i) incentives, or 
willingness on the part of both NSP and government to engage, and ii) lack of 
information and technical and administrative capacity to engage effectively. In low 
capacity settings, formal policy dialogue may be imperfect, unrepresentative and 
unhelpful. It is often constrained by mistrust and is prone to being hijacked by large 
NGOs. It is debatable whether such dialogue has any real impact on the provision of 
services by non-state providers, in which case the risks of doing harm are minimal. 
However, the risks of dialogue being exclusionary and ineffectual appear to be more 
apparent at the more formal end of the spectrum of dialogue, where the capacity 
demands are also greatest.  
 
4.2 Regulation  
 
Whereas policy frameworks and dialogue affect the general environment of service 
delivery, regulation is much more interventionist; it imposes obligatory requirements on 
non-state actors. While the promotion of policy dialogue is one of the main spheres of 
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donor action, the improvement of regulatory practice is one of the least. This is perhaps 
because regulation is clouded by ambiguity for donors, governments and NSPs: it can 
act as a negative as well as a positive instrument, suppressing non-state activity or 
promoting its more efficient operation. It can take the form of ‘command and control’ 
approaches (for example, imposing minimum qualifications for permission to operate) 
or of ‘regulation by facilitation’, which involves the use of incentives (for example, 
subsidies) in return for compliance with required standards (Palmer, 2006).  
While most governments have a hefty legal armoury of regulations regarding 
service provision, these are rarely effectively applied in practice because of capacity 
constraints. Regulatory organisations often lack staff, skills, enforcement powers, or 
information on the sector to be regulated (Mills et al., 2001). Even in relatively strong 
states, capacity to regulate successfully – particularly in relation to enforcement and 
monitoring – has been weak. Mills et al. (2001) and Balabanova et al. (2008) analyse 
the failure of the Indian government to regulate the private health sector, in spite of 
comprehensive legal instruments being in place. In the case of fragile states, weak and 
contested public authorities are particularly likely to face difficulties in enforcing rules 
that limit private interests. The Liberian pharmaceutical sector is an example where a 
combination of lack of commitment and political will to enforce the laws, together with 
conflicts over vested interests, has resulted in regulations and policies that are confused 
and contradictory, with unclear allocation of responsibility for implementation and 
enforcement (Osmond et al., 2007). 
Regulation that seeks to place controls on ‘entry’ into the market often takes the 
form of highly bureaucratic schemes that place an enormous burden on the capacity of 
the regulator and can be prohibitively cumbersome or expensive for NSPs.4 This type of 
regulation typically focuses on monitoring inputs and restricting competition, rather 
than on the quality of outputs (Batley, 2006). Based on studies in sub-Saharan Africa 
and South Asia, Rose (2006) finds that regulation gives much less attention to the 
quality and accessibility of non-government schools than to stipulations regarding 
inputs: for example, requirements for equipment, the dimensions of school buildings 
and ensuring that they maintain a certain distance from government schools. This form 
of regulation is unlikely to impact positively on service outcomes. Moreover, command 
and control regulation may be used against the non-state sector where there is a direct 
government service to protect and there is competition for resources and customers 
(Batley, 2006). Double standards, whereby the government asks private operators to 
abide by requirements far beyond those attained in public facilities, are common in 
weak and disrupted health systems, for example in Afghanistan, Northern Uganda and 
Angola (Pavignani and Colombo, 2009: 341).  
Given the combination of questionable incentives and weak capacity for 
regulation, it is not surprising that regulation does not always address the performance 
of the providers that are most important to the poor. In Bangladesh, for instance, the 
focus has been on undertaking and enforcing the registration of qualified doctors. In 
contrast, there was no control of the unqualified providers in the private sector, even 
though these were the most important providers for the poor (Chowdhury et al., 2004). 
                                                          
4. For example, in Nigeria, schools have to register with the Environment Agency, Ministry of Health, Fire 
Brigade, and Water Corporation, each of which requires a registration fee (see Rose, 2007). 
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Applying a regulatory framework in informal markets is extremely difficult, partly 
because information on small-scale, informal non-state providers is usually severely 
lacking, especially in fragile settings. Moreover, ‘the scattered nature of small-scale 
health providers makes traditional monitoring (e.g. in terms of visits or inspections) a 
formidable challenge’ (Palmer, 2006: 235). Appropriate instruments to regulate this 
sector are likely to be of an incremental, indirect and informal nature, beginning with 
simply building information on the scale and nature of NSP activity (Pavignani and 
Colombo, 2009: 17).  
If universal regulation is impractical, a more selective alternative is to reward 
those non-state providers that achieve certain performance standards through incentive-
based regulation. This requires less capacity on the part of government, presents less 
risk of harming NSP without achieving compensatory benefits, and is voluntary, not 
impositional. An example is government provision of training and equipment for 
immunisation to traditional birth attendants who register with government in Enugu 
State, Nigeria. Another is the programme of the Government of Bangladesh with WHO, 
under which poor pregnant women are issued vouchers that can be used only to pay 
accredited providers of antenatal care and delivery (Palmer, 2006; Chowdhury et al., 
2004).  
Substitutes for state regulation, such as franchised service provision and 
community monitoring, are another less demanding alternative. They allow for the 
regulator to be divorced from the predatory interest of government and at least partly 
from the interests of providers (Batley, 2006). Franchised service provision involves an 
NGO or private company franchising others that meet its standards. An example is 
Social Marketing Pakistan, an NGO which franchises private clinics and pharmacies to 
provide a defined package of reproductive health services, whose quality is monitored 
(Palmer, 2006; Batley et al., 2004). Communities or client-users can also become part of 
the process of regulation. In Mozambique, for example, government plans to strengthen 
its capacity to regulate informal providers by identifying key aspects of service 
performance at the local level, and inviting community committees to monitor them 
(Trémolet, 2006).  
Overall, the assessment of risk of harm associated with regulation must be 
considered in the light of the fact that much of it is unenforced or avoided because 
capacity for implementation in fragile settings is weak. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
certain types of regulation, if enforced, require more capacity and present greater 
potential for harm than others. Command and control regulation has been unnecessarily 
elaborate, has not usually focused on the quality and accessibility of services, and has 
placed unrealistic capacity requirements on both the implementing agency and NSPs. 
Universal regulation has been more demanding than localised approaches and is 
unrealistic in fragile settings. It is also least likely to address the performance of the 
providers that are most important to the poor. Forms of regulation where the rules are 
slimmed down, focused more on the quality of outputs and based more on incentives 
than controls, and substitutes for state regulation, such as external and self-accreditation, 
franchised service provision and community monitoring, place fewer imposed demands 
on the actors and are more capable of being focused on improving services. 
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4.3 Contracting  
 
Contracting NSPs to deliver services (contracting out) or to support government 
delivery (contracting in) are increasingly supported by donors in states with high will 
but low capacity (OECD, 2008b: 34). Whereas regulation usually seeks 
(unsuccessfully) to impose government standards and requirements on all actors in a 
policy field, contracting locks particular non-state actors into a more direct and 
obligatory relationship with government. The legal and one-to-one nature of the 
contractual relationship gives government a much more direct stake, as well as greater 
opportunity to observe non-compliance and to enforce requirements. Through 
contracting, government can set and enforce standards for the non-state sector, and 
expectations of measurable results (Loevinsohn and Harding, 2005: 676).  
But contracting requires strong organisational capacity in design, management and 
monitoring (Balabanova et al., 2008: 42). Even where there is experience of contracting, 
contracts are often designed and managed poorly because of basic administrative 
failures and unclear roles and responsibilities (Batley and Larbi, 2004). Without a 
supportive external environment of public-sector rules, regulations, laws and policies, it 
is difficult for public-sector organisations to maintain commitments and therefore to 
gain the confidence of contractors. Contracting may also require a strong relational 
element. Recent research in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh has shown that, even where 
contractual relationships are formally hierarchical (the government paying NGOs to 
produce a service – often with donor funding), the most effective agreements were those 
that had a strong relational element (Batley and Rose, forthcoming). 
In fragile contexts, where governments cannot guarantee political and economic 
stability or a legal system that would ensure contractual rights, formal contracting can 
hardly be effective (Batley, 2006). In Cambodia, for example, the effectiveness of 
public-private partnerships has been hampered by the widespread lack of transparency, 
the government’s failure to negotiate contracts openly and the tendency of government 
officials to bypass laws and administrative processes in awarding contracts (Rondinelli, 
2006: 26). There can also be profound cultural and institutional constraints that manifest 
themselves as social and political resistance to the involvement of non-state providers, 
and lack of political capacity to face down official interests. Some forms of contract 
require more capacity on the part of government than others, as was found in a study of 
the contracting out of urban water supply and health-care in Africa and South Asia 
(Batley and Larbi, 2004; Mills et al., 2001). Short-term ‘spot’ contracts for one-off 
inputs (for example, building works, or the supply of materials) are likely to be easier to 
design and manage than longer-term, more complex arrangements, such as management 
contracts and concessions. The design of these contracts requires a great deal of 
information and experience to anticipate all the risks and uncertainties that may occur 
during the term of the contract.  
Designing contractual requirements, assessing bids and developing and overseeing 
performance measures are particularly difficult in fragile settings where there is likely to 
be a lack of basic information on the cost and quality of public and private service 
provision. Monitoring has been constrained by insufficient human resources and/or lack 
of incentives across a broader range of sectors and contexts (Mcloughlin, 2008). In the 
case of large-scale, performance-based contracting for the delivery of a Basic Package 
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of Health Services in Afghanistan, it was acknowledged that lack of current data 
necessitated a pragmatic and imperfect approach to costing (Ameli and Newbrander, 
2007: 1). Similarly, in Liberia and South Sudan, lack of baseline information on health 
activity and financing has constrained the development of a policy framework for 
contracting (Carlson, 2007: 10). In Afghanistan, even where technical capacity is in 
place, specifying and monitoring contracts for the delivery of services in remote areas 
has been challenging (Palmer et al., 2006: 720).  
It cannot be assumed that the necessary will or capacity to enter into contractual 
agreements exists within the non-state sector, any more than in government. There is a 
risk that tight performance-based contracts, in particular, may rule out the local and 
informal providers that are often most important to poor people. In Sudan, for example, 
the scale of the contracts being offered – to deliver health services in entire provinces – 
meant that some NGOs were unwilling, or unable, to take them on. The Ministry of 
Health has had to revise the terms to make them more appealing to NGOs (Carlson, 
2007: 18). NGOs may also be unwilling to enter into contracts with government 
because of weak financial incentives, lack of trust in government, and lack of 
confidence in its ability and commitment to pay (Mcloughlin, 2008). Small NGOs may 
be particularly reluctant to see themselves as agents of government, displacing their 
independent perceptions of the means and ends of public policy.5 
Given the capacity requirements, much of the large-scale, formal contracting 
adopted in fragile states has relied on heavy financial and technical support and 
leadership from donors. Questions therefore arise about the sustainability of these 
contracts, given their reliance on donors’ presence and the corresponding tendency to 
marginalise governments. Partnerships are only likely to be effective ‘if governments 
maintain an active role in the management of the agreements rather than being left as a 
third party as international donors collaborate separately with NGOs’ (Waters et al., 
2007). Where government retains a strategic space and a role in the allocation and 
monitoring of contracts, in principle it retains responsibility for the quality and delivery 
of services (Commins, 2006: 23). Whereas in Afghanistan, government has retained 
such a role in the donor-funded Grants and Contract Management Unit, in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo government has been more or less excluded from the 
process, amounting to a ‘state avoidance’ strategy whereby contracts are established 
between the donor and contractor (Waldman, 2006).  
Direct funding of NGOs by donors may undermine government capacity-building, 
even where the plan is eventually to transfer the service-delivery function to the state. In 
Afghanistan, as Zivetz (2006: 8) observes, ‘local health offices have little in the way of 
capacity, and resources flow directly to NGOs from Kabul. NGO salaries are higher and 
more reliable than government salaries, facilities where staff are only receiving 
government salaries were found to be largely non-functional … It is not surprising that 
local health departments find it difficult to exert their own authority in this situation.’ 
Whilst contracts may incorporate clauses for ‘transition planning’ – i.e. planning for the 
hand-back of service functions to the state, or the development of state capacity to 
                                                          
5. Economic and Social Research Council-funded research: ‘Whose Public Action? Analysing inter-sectoral 
collaboration for service delivery’. Reports are available at: http://www.idd.bham.ac.uk/research/ 
service_providers.shtml#Whose 
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manage them (Brinkerhoff, 2008; OECD, 2008 b) – there are real constraints on this in 
practice. An evaluation of the Basic Services Fund in Southern Sudan found that, whilst 
most NGO contracts included provision for training government staff, establishing 
community structures to oversee them, phasing out NGO incentives and handing over 
staff to the government payroll, there were almost no instances where this had actually 
occurred. Ministries were simply in no position to take over staff. Contact between 
NGOs and government was at the level of information-sharing and consultation rather 
than co-planning, with the result that there was little sense of government ownership 
(Morton and Denny, 2008; Mott McDonald, 2008: 7).  
Institutional structures that completely bypass the state also risk creating confused 
and complex systems of local accountability. In Nepal, the World Bank contracted out 
rural water supply projects to NGOs and the private sector through a ‘Fund Board’ – an 
institution that was located separately from local government structures. This 
arrangement was criticised for encouraging accountability to the Fund Board rather than 
to the community being served. In addition, the rigid, input-focused nature of the 
contracts was seen to have restricted NGOs from using approaches to suit local 
conditions and needs (Clayton, 1999).  
While it is accepted that contract management by public ministries shifts 
accountability from donors and NGOs to the state (Zivetz, 2006: 21), it is also 
recognised that, in the worst fragile situations, such an arrangement may not be feasible. 
Where there is no real prospect of reforming the civil service, Collier (2007) advocates 
the development of Independent Service Authorities (ISAs) to act as wholesale 
contractors of both public and non-state service provision.6 While ISAs would be 
autonomous, government would have at least a symbolic presence in a system of joint 
management with donors and civil society that would evolve to phase out donor 
representatives (Bold et al., 2009). While this approach avoids bypassing the state 
completely, as Sondorp (cited in Balabanova et al., 2008: 37) argues with reference to 
Afghanistan, the relative autonomy and isolation of the contract management unit from 
the process of policy and strategy formulation can mean that contracted-out services are 
not fully aligned with policy priorities. 
It is clear that the level of capacity required for contracting will differ according to 
the sector, and to the scale, level of formality and length of contract. But, in any form, 
contracting is a technically demanding and complex role. Since it imposes conditions 
and obligations on actors who are directly engaged in a formal relationship with 
government, it has the greatest potential to impact on their activities. Such direct impact 
may be damaging if it is not well-managed. Large-scale, monolithic approaches to 
contracting present the greatest capacity requirements and risks, and rely heavily on 
donor support. Institutional arrangements for contracting that are separate from or 
completely bypass governments do not directly address the need to build state capacity 
and local accountability channels. However, the technical and financial demands of 
contracting mean that in some fragile states such arrangements may be the only feasible 
option. 
                                                          
6. Key features of ISAs are that they facilitate a high degree of civil-society scrutiny over service delivery, 
set up a basis of competition between public, private and NGO provision, and perform continuous 
evaluation to determine whether government, NGO or private provision works best. 
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4.4 Informal and mutual agreements 
 
If large-scale, formal contracting presents particular difficulties, there are alternatives in 
small-scale, local and more informal arrangements. Small-scale, local-level contracting 
may occur more sporadically, may be less resource-intensive, and may allow a more 
incremental approach to the development of contracting capacity.  
An example is the relationship between the district health board and faith-based 
hospitals in Enugu State, Nigeria. In this pilot case, the government agreed that, because 
Enugu had no district hospital, it would heavily subsidise selected faith-based hospitals 
to provide emergency obstetric care for women. An evaluation of the pilot noted that a 
key to success was the fact that the State Health Board devolved responsibility for the 
scheme to district level. Such small-scale, practical examples provide government with 
some experience to build on and to demonstrate that successful collaboration is possible 
(PATHS, 2008: 98).  
Informal mutual agreements, based on independent contributions by the partners 
and non-hierarchic relationships between them, may also avoid the capacity problems 
and tensions implicit in formal contracting, and the need for institutional structures that 
bypass the state. Mutual agreements may involve government and NGOs in contributing 
their own separate funding to common or complementary ends and taking on distinct 
roles. They depend more on accumulated social capital and may be less technically 
demanding because parties bring their own financial and human resources, and neither 
stands in authority over the other (Batley, 2006; Batley and Rose, forthcoming).  
One example of mutuality can be found in Bangladesh, where government and 
NGOs agreed Memoranda of Understanding outlining their respective tasks in the 
delivery of the National TB Control Programme. The government provided treatment 
protocols, policy guidelines, drugs supplies and overall monitoring, while the NGOs 
provided essential services in local implementation, management and awareness-raising. 
In this case, trust, recognition of comparative advantage, favourable regulatory 
frameworks, effective monitoring, transparency, and continued commitment were 
essential preconditions for successful and sustainable collaboration (Ullah et al., 2006). 
A similar arrangement has been successful in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where 
NGOs have supported the implementation of the government TB programme in remote 
provinces. This case demonstrates that collaboration is possible even in very poor socio-
economic situations where the state is disorganised, but only if consultation and 
dialogue are in place, and if partners have clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
(Ndongosieme et al., 2007). But partnerships based on mutual contributions may be a 
means of achieving collective goals only when there is a good strategic fit between 
collaborators, and when the benefits outweigh individual action (Aga Khan Foundation, 
2007: 25).  
Research on NGO-government relations in service delivery in South Asia found 
that long-standing informal relationships provided an important basis of trust and 
mutual influence between the parties (Batley and Rose, forthcoming).7 More durable 
contractual relations had often evolved out of these earlier informal agreements, and 
                                                          
7. Working papers analysing experience across service sectors are available at http://www.idd.bham.ac.uk/ 
research/service_providers.shtml#Whose 
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retained their earlier relational quality.8 An example of this is the evolution of 
government relations with mission health facilities in Zimbabwe, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Papua New Guinea. Historically these operated on the basis of missionary 
funding but, as this source declined, they were either taken over or part-funded by 
governments.9 In Malawi, relationships initially based on trust, with no formal 
agreement, have moved from unwritten understandings to written MOUs, and from 
2004 to formal service agreements. Within the framework of the service agreement, the 
managerial autonomy of hospitals to decide how to deliver the service is protected by 
the fact that they negotiate collectively through their association (Green et al., 2002; 
Kadzamira et al., 2004). 
Co-production, which involves an informal agreement between formal 
organisations and communities or service recipients where both make substantial 
resource contributions (Joshi and Moore, 2004), is another form of mutuality. Water and 
sanitation are rich in cases of co-production, the most widely cited being that of the 
Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Pakistan (Ahmed and Sohail, 2003; Sansom, 2006). Here, 
public utilities provide large sewers in agreement with community committees to fund 
and develop local sanitation systems, facilitated by an experienced local NGO. The OPP 
has untied independent funding, avoids written agreements, and pursues its own 
approach to community sanitation in informal relational agreements with government 
and communities.  
It is clear that local agreements involving joint financing or collaboration in 
complementary projects between either state and non-state service providers or 
providers and recipients require less capacity than formal contracting. Because they are 
voluntary, do not impose formal authority and may evolve as trust builds, they also 
present less chance of having a damaging impact on the non-state provider. Their 
informal relational origins allow for joint learning. They have worked best where 
responsibility for the relationship is devolved to the level of government responsible for 
implementing it. There is a need for clarity of roles, but also flexibility to allow non-
state actors to draw on their strengths and to innovate. But small-scale informal 
agreements do not lend themselves to organised ‘scaling up’. Their extension depends 
on slower processes of imitation, example and institutional replication (Batley, 2006: 
250). 
 
5 Hierarchies of risk and capacity 
 
Based on the evidence from the preceding sections, Table 1 presents the types of 
engagement by governments with NSPs in two broad categories: (i) the level of capacity 
required to perform state roles, and (ii) the level of risk (or possibility of doing harm) to 
the non-state sector resulting from the poor performance of state roles. 
                                                          
8. This is the opposite of the trajectory widely described in developed countries where formal contracts 
usually precede the development of trust and relational understandings (MacNeil, 1978; Gazely, 2007; 
Brown and Troutt, 2004; Van Slyke, 2006).  
9. Mission hospitals are important providers, offering between 45% and 50% of health-care services in 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda and Papua New Guinea, and 35% in Malawi and Zambia. 
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With regard to capacity, activities within each type of engagement are shown in a 
hierarchy running from those which demand less capacity to those that demand more. 
The potential for failed interventions increases as we move up each column. So, for 
reasons outlined in the previous section, making short-term contracts demands less 
capacity (and presents less possibility of failure) than long-term concession 
arrangements. Comprehensive contracting out, formal policy dialogue and universal 
regulation of providers are more demanding than localised approaches, including 
informal and mutual agreements and ongoing operational dialogue.  
The risk of doing harm grows when state intervention is imposed obligatorily on 
and directly affects specific non-state actors. Certain functions – policy dialogue, setting 
the policy framework, and entering into mutual agreements – are unlikely to harm non-
state provision if they are performed badly, but could support good service provision if 
they are done well. They are relatively risk-free because they affect only the general 
environment of service provision and/or do not impose directly on specific non-state 
actors. By comparison, those functions – regulation and contracts – which imply a direct 
controlling and co-ordinating role for the state and impose obligations on specific NSPs 
risk doing harm both to particular service providers and to the general level and quality 
of service provision.  
The dilemma for donors and governments is that the most desirable interventions 
from a service-delivery viewpoint – for example, getting mass service delivery quickly 
operational by contracting it universally to NGOs – present a high risk of adverse 
effects, if government lacks the capacity to contract and the institutional conditions are 
not in place to enforce terms. From a service-delivery perspective, the weakness of 
services in fragile states may require large-scale and more interventionist approaches, 
and the fragmented nature of non-state provision may indicate the need for quick co-
ordination. However, from a state-building perspective, the institutional conditions 
should be established before very concrete initiatives are taken to work with NSPs. The 
latter would argue for an incremental process of dialogue, leading to the design of 
legally and financially supported policy frameworks, and the step-by-step development 
of capacity to contract and regulate. This would recognise the difficulty of building 
capacity whilst also presenting opportunities to do so incrementally, ‘learning by doing’ 
as they move towards more complex and formal relationships with non-state actors.  
While there is no systematic evidence on how donor programmes have supported 
the development of governments’ capacity to perform the indirect roles in fragile 
situations, the published material indicates that they have not followed this sort of 
logical progression of institutional development. Donor activity in fragile and non-
fragile situations has focused on promoting only a few of the alternative forms of 
engagement, some of them at the higher end of demands on government capacity and 
risk to the non-state sector: 
 
• formal national-level policy dialogue rather than the local and less formal 
dialogue that would be more likely to engage with service providers, including 
small private entrepreneurs;  
• development of general and sector policy frameworks, with emphasis on 
promoting ‘partnerships’ in service delivery; 
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• contracting by governments (with donor financing) in large-scale, medium or 
long-term programmes; 
• developing accountability of service providers to consumer groups. 
 
Donors have left largely untouched the spheres of informal and more local-level 
dialogue; informal, more mutual agreements between governments and NSPs; and 
almost the whole sphere of regulation, including the less impositional, more incentive-
based approaches described above. Informal, mutual and local-level engagements 
provide opportunities for learning and the development of trust between state and non-
state actors, but, on the other hand, present problems of ‘scaling-up’. 
 
6 Conclusion  
 
Non-state service provision is a universal feature of developing countries, though it is 
more prolific in some than others. However, ‘it’ is not one but many phenomena, 
varying between countries and localities in their organisational form and capacity, the 
importance of their activities, whom they serve, their accessibility to sections of the 
population, and the nature of this relationship with the state. The possibilities for state 
engagement therefore have to be assessed in particular contexts. What is striking is that 
scarcely any such assessment is ever made.  
The case for state engagement with the non-state sector can be made on the 
grounds of the deficiencies of service provision by the market, left to its own devices. 
The OECD debate about fragile states adds the case that state legitimacy may depend on 
its being seen to provide services as part of the ‘social contract’ with citizens. However, 
this article has shown that there is good reason for caution: the literature indicates 
widespread deficiencies in the capacity of state actors to intervene supportively. It 
would be wrong to set the ambition of ‘managing’ or ‘harnessing’ (Vaux and Wisman, 
2005) non-state provision in its entirety; this has not happened in any developing 
country.  
The most acute constraints on government undertaking indirect roles in service 
provision in fragile and conflict-affected situations are at the general level of the state’s 
legitimacy, coverage and competence. The lack of information on the nature, cost, 
quality, and coverage of non-state services – particularly in relation to the informal 
sector – constrains comprehensive state engagement whether through dialogue, policy 
planning, contract specification, or regulation. As much as government capacity, the 
capacity and willingness of non-state actors influences the potential for successful 
engagement. Understanding the nature of the non-state sector (its size, formality, level 
of organisation) in any given context, and the limits of its willingness to engage with 
government, is an important starting point for designing mutually beneficial forms of 
engagement.  
Where the indirect roles are undertaken in the context of weak government and 
NSP capacity, there are risks, first, that interventions are exclusionary or ignore the 
smaller or informal providers that are important to the poor, and, second, that they may 
damage non-state service provision without providing compensatory benefits. Where 
the capacity demands of the roles are highest, there is a tendency towards greater 
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reliance on donors, which calls into question whether or to what extent the performance 
of the roles can contribute to state-building. 
The capacity demands are probably greatest and the risks of damaging NSP 
without gains are probably largest where state intervention directly controls non-state 
actors – that is, in the case of formal regulation and long-term classical contracts. They 
are least significant in the case of functions that set the general environment and are 
permissive (policy dialogue, making local mutual agreements, and supporting 
accountability to consumers).  
Governments and donors are faced with difficult strategic choices about how to 
deploy their limited capacity for engagement with NSPs most effectively, and without 
risk to pro-poor or pro-service outcomes. In fragile or conflict-affected settings, there is 
an overriding international goal of supporting state-building. There is no meaningful 
way of resolving these alternative priorities by deciding which of the possible functions 
(policy-making, regulation, contracting or direct service delivery) would be more 
inclined to build states, and then trying to bring them about regardless of capacity and 
context. The better approach is to accept that undertaking any of these functions can be 
a state-building activity, and then to identify, in the particular country context, which, if 
any, mode of engagement would most enable improved service provision, be most 
feasible in terms of capacity and willingness to undertake them, and present the lowest 
risk of failure and damage to non-state service provision. 
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